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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is one of the most disputable topics in finance that is vastly associated 
with , market value, profit, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the economic system. 
Furthermore its’ importance has been emphasized widely in early literatures [Yermack (1996), 
Gompers et al. (2001), Klapper and Love (2004), Florackis et al (2009), and Vukčević (2012)].  
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The Ownership structure is also recognized as one of the main corporate governance 
mechanisms where the correlation between ownership structure and firm value initiate from the 
separation of ownership and management (Berle and Means, 1932, Velury and Jenkins (2006)). 
This is known as agency theory, which explains managers and owners have different interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However to avoid being expropriated by 
managers, shareholders tend to control them, whereas monitoring companies’ managers and 
gaining information imposes costs on shareholders and results in a free rider problem 2 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Edmans, 2014). On the other hand, group of shareholders might be 
controlling shareholders (Bonaventura et al. 2017); this group normally includes large 
shareholders, known as blockholders,3 that can play an important role in governance because 
their large stakes motivate them to accept the costs of monitoring managers (Edmans, 2014). 
The early literatures show that the impact of blockholders on corporate governance depends on 
the level of ownership concentration (Khan et al., 2005, Thomsen et al., 2006; Basu et al., 
2016) and regulations in each market (Lins, 2003). However, from there the relationships 
between non-managerial and managerial blockholders and the firm value is not conclusive. 
Considering the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of London Stock Exchange market, by 
growing the AIM, its market regulatory framework has evolved continuously to protect 
investors. Nonetheless, it still needs to balance its regulations to meet the demands of small and 
growing companies as well as investors. This has been indicated in early literature that the 
ownership concentration in the UK is low and the investor protection is high, and as result the 
impact of blockholders on the firm value is insignificant.  
However, the opposite relationship is expected between blockholders and firm value in the 
AIM —firstly because the main market emphasises the independent operations of the 
companies4 and does not allow companies with blockholders owning more than 30 per cent of 
                                                          
2 Outside investors face a risk of not receiving a return on their investment because the controlling shareholders or 
managers expropriate them. Shareholders who wish to monitor managers have to accept all the costs but earn just 
a fraction of profit. Because they are not the only shareholders and profit will be divided among all the company’s 
shareholders, this problem is defined by Grossman and Hart (1980) as the free rider problem. 
3 Blockholders are defined as shareholders who own more than five per cent of total shares. 
4 The board, managerial and operational independence code includes a number of requirements to ensure the 
independency of the company’s board, management and operations that might not be possible under regimes with 
fewer requirements and especially in the context of closely held companies. These include the regulations that at 
least 50 per cent of the board should be made up of independent non-executive directors, that the roles of 
chairman and chief executive should be separated, and that firms have to follow certain minimum requirements for 
the establishment, composition and responsibilities of board committees. 
total shares to list in the market, while there is no limitation on the blockholding for companies 
listing in the AIM (Witty et al., 2012), and high ownership concentration is thus expected in the 
AIM; and secondly, all the companies listed in the main market should consider the 
requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code and provide the required disclosure in 
their annual report as to their agreement with the Code; conversely, companies in the AIM do 
not have to prepare requirements that are equivalent to the Code (Murphy et al., 2012). Hence 
investor protection is lower in the AIM than the main market. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the value of the firms listed in the AIM might be affected significantly by blockholders 
because of the possibility of high ownership concentration and lower investor protection.  
In this study we investigate the impact of blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the 
AIM by examining the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of 
the firms listed in the AIM. More specifically here, the main research question is to investigate 
whether the managerial and non-managerial blockholders impacting the firm value 
significantly in the AIM due to the AIM has high ownership concentration and low investor 
protection. 
Here, the sample used includes 443 companies listed in the AIM on 31st December 2013 and 
having blockholder ownership of at least five per cent of total shares and a minimum of six 
years data available. Also, the sample is divided into two groups of 125 managerial 
blockholders and 318 non-managerial blockholders. Moreover, as ownership is an endogenous 
variable in analysing the relationship between ownership concentration and the firm value 
(Miguel et al., 2006), and this endogeneity can be in the form of dynamic or reverse causality 
(Henry, 2010), the impact of blockholders on the firm value is examined using the generalised 
method of moment (GMM) to control the dynamic aspect and Granger causality to control the 
reverse causality aspect of endogeneity.  
The primary empirical finding justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the 
AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve 
the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32 per cent. However, 
when their block sizes exceed 32 per cent, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.  
Hence this study finds evidence for both monitoring and expropriation hypotheses by finding a 
quadratic relationship between non-managerial blockholders and firm value. Furthermore, 
examining the impact of managerial blockholders and the firm value illustrates that managerial 
blockholders have a cubic relationship with firm value. This cubic relationship explains the 
relationship between managerial blockholders and the firm value as follow: 
• managers who own between 5 and 31 per cent of total shares improve the firm value 
because their interests converge with the interests of other shareholders; 
• managers who own between 31 and 54 per cent of total shares enrich themselves at the 
expense of other shareholders and thus decrease the firm value;  
• finally, the group of managers having more than 54 per cent of total shares increases the 
firm value again, because their interests are converged with those of other shareholders. 
In this study section 2 debates the relevant literatures. Section 3 discusses about the data and 
methodology. Section 4 describes the empirical findings and finally section 5 concludes the 
article. 
2. Literature Review  
An agency problem arises from the separation of ownership and control; thus, because of the 
separated goals of managers and shareholders, management might run the company for their 
own benefit instead of the shareholders’ benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Dyl, 1988). Monitoring managers is costly; therefore, shareholders with small shares rely 
on just the markets’ regulations to protect themselves from being expropriated by managers (La 
Porta et al., 2000). However, if the blockholders are also the managers of the company, they 
can affect the firm value more easily because they have both cash flow and control rights (Lins, 
2003). More generally, Ursel and Zhong (2017) show that presence of blockholders, insiders or 
outsiders decrease the board power.   
 Non-managerial and Managerial Blockholders and Firm Value 
Hirschman (1982) mentions that blockholders can affect governance by two mechanisms: 
direct intervention (voice) and exit. According to Edmans (2014), voice includes any activity 
that a blockholder can carry out that increases a firm’s value, while paying costs. Edmans 
(2014) mentions that generally blockholders who are able to impact the firm’s decisions by 
voice are blockholders with large blocks which enable them to minimize and postpone the 
disclosure of information in order to increase the chance of fulfilling their plans. Thus, other 
shareholders might not be able to intervene, or have to make their decisions based on 
inadequate information. Poor disclosure exacerbates the information asymmetry problem, and 
the large blockholder might trade based on insider information and take advantage of private 
information. 
Edmans et al. (2013) explain that certain blockholders’ competitive advantage might be based 
on selecting stocks, instead of beginning a proxy fight or delivering strategic advices, and 
advising a manager of a new strategy might be beyond their main strength. In addition, as 
mentioned by different literatures such as Winton (1993), Noe (2002), and Edmans and Manso 
(2011), one of the main drivers of governance by voice is block size; therefore, it is difficult for 
blockholders with small block sizes to control governance by voice. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011) note that blockholders are informed 
traders that control management by exit. In their models, blockholders’ exit exerts downward 
pressure on the stock price that affects management by its equity interest in the firm. Hence 
management will try to choose strategies, which persuade blockholders to stay with the 
company.  
However, when managers do not follow the blockholders’ recommendations and care about 
their private benefit, then blockholders will use the option of exit; therefore exit enhances the 
power of voice. Furthermore, studies such as those by Bharath et al. (2013) and Edmans et al. 
(2013) conclude that there is one more mechanism that blockholders can use in order to affect 
governance: this mechanism is threat of exit and voice. Edmans et al. (2013) argue that the 
absence of voice and exit does not indicate the absence of blockholders’ impact on governance; 
on the contrary, the threat of voice and exit might be enough to encourage the managers to 
maximize firms ‘value.  
Various studies support monitoring hypothesis by evaluating the relationship between 
blockholders and firm value in different markets. They mention that ownership concentration 
has a positive impact on the firm value by affecting the firm’s productivity. (Hill and Snell, 
1989).  
Different literatures categourized the impact of blockholders on the firm value in different 
ways for instance, Basu et al. (2016) explain three ways that existing blockholders can impact 
the firm value. First, expropriation; second, monitoring and third threat of exit. They also 
mentioned that this impact would be more significant when blockholders’ stake is larger. On 
the other hand, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010), categorize the impact of blockholders on the 
firm value based on outcome of the effect, which can be both positive and negative. Bennedsen 
and Nielsen (2010) explain that positive effect, which they called as incentive effect, makes the 
monitoring effect more efficient; and, on the opposite side, the negative effect called as 
entrenchment effect, create the opportunity for blockholders to expropriate minority owners.  
Berle and Means (1993), Han and Suk (1998), Lins (2003), Cheung et al. (2005) and Jiang et 
al. (2011) suggest that the impact of managerial blockholders on the firm value might be 
different from the impact of outside blockholders because a large number of the firms have 
managers whose control rights exceed their cash flow right.5 Moreover, as mentioned by To et 
al. (2017) insiders might have superior information about the firm, Thus as Basu et al. (2016) 
believe in studying about the impact of blockholders’ power on the firm value, it is important 
to distinguish whether the power is concentrated in the insiders’ hands or outsiders’ hands. 
Furthermore, Arifin (2003) notify that in studying managerial blockholders, the role of family 
ownership 6 is highlighted as family ownership is very widespread in most developed and 
developing countries.   
Fama and Jensen (1983), McConaughny et al. (2001), Yammeesri and Lodh (2006), Suehiro 
(2001), and Anderson and Reeb (2003) all believe that as the firms with family ownership are 
owned and controlled by the same people, the cost of monitoring in these companies decreases 
and the agency problem is alleviated, all of which results in higher firm value. On the other 
hand, Maury and Pajuste (2005) show that families having managerial or board representation 
have more intention to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by other 
blockholders.  
In early literature Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce the alignment hypothesis where they 
refers to the managers’ natural tendency to allocate the firm’s resources according to their own 
best interests, which can be in conflict with the interests of outside shareholders and firm value. 
By increasing insider ownership, the conflicting interests converge; therefore the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders can be diminished. The convergence of interest 
hypothesis suggests that by increasing the managerial ownership, firm value ultimately 
increases. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) suggest the entrenchment hypothesis, 
which it shows that excessive managerial ownership has a negative correlation with firm value.  
As the London Stock Exchange considers that a comprehensive requirement to ‘comply or 
explain’ by reference to a particular code would not be suitable for the smaller, growing 
                                                          
5 Bergström, and Rydqvist (1990), Zingales (1994) and Nenova (2003) mention that, in order to achieve high 
control rights, managers issue and buy shares with superior voting rights. 
6 Arifin (2003) defines family ownership as managerial blockholders who are part of founding families. 
companies that make up the AIM’s constituent members, the AIM rules for these companies do 
not require adherence to a particular set of corporate governance rules (Murphy and Cronin, 
2012). Consequently, as the result of weak external corporate governance, AIM blockholders 
are expected to protect themselves by monitoring managers when their block sizes are small or 
medium.  
Moreover, as mentioned previously, corporate governance of the AIM does not emphasise the 
independent operations of the companies; therefore blockholders with large stakes can impact a 
company’s operations in order to satisfy their own interests and expropriate small shareholders; 
in this case, large non-managerial blockholders can decrease the firm value. Therefore the first 
hypothesis predicts a curvilinear association between ownership concentration and firm value 
and thus considers both monitoring and expropriation effects. This is plotted in Figure 1. 
Hypothesis I: Firm value first rises and, after a breakpoint, declines as block size increases.  
Figure 1. Quadratic relationship between non-managerial blockholders and firm value
 
Note: The monitoring and expropriation hypotheses used to explain the relationship between non-
managerial blockholders and firm value in the AIM. NBH shows non-managerial blockholders. 
Here this quadratic equation based on hypothesis I can be express as follow:  
FVit = β0 + β1NBHit + β2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2+ βitFVt-1 + βitCit + εit                         (1) 
Where FV is the company market value market, NBH and NBH2 denote non-managerial block 
size and its square, FVt-1 shows lag one of firm value, and C refers to explanatory and control 
variables. Here the first control variable is firm size, which controls for the possibility that firm 
value and ownership are related by the size of the company and measured by log of assets. 
Leverage is the next control variable, which considers structural differences that companies use 
in terms of their long- and short-term financing tools in different countries and is measured by 
the ratio of the total long-term and short-term debt to total assets at end of the preceding year. 
The next control variable is intangible fixed assets as a proxy for future growth opportunities 
and is calculated as the logarithm of intangible assets at the end of the preceding year. Finally, 
εit refers to the error term. The first subscript of the variables (i) refers to firms, and the second 
(t) to business year. From the Figure 1, the firm value first increases because of the monitoring 
effect and then decreases under the effect of expropriation. 
However, Short and Keasey (1999) find some differences between corporate governance 
mechanisms in the US and the UK, which explain that the entrenchment effect can appear at 
higher levels of managerial blockholding in the UK. Hence, as the AIM has weaker external 
corporate governance mechanisms than LSE main market, so the level at which the AIM 
managerial blockholders enrich might be higher than other managerial blockholders in the 
main market of the UK. Thus the cubic relationship can be defined to explain the relationship 
between managerial blockholders and the firm value in the AIM.  
This implies firm value first decreases because of enrichment and, at a higher level of 
managerial ownership, the interests of managers and other shareholders converge and increase 
the firm value.  
Hypothesis II: Firm value first increases, then decreases, and finally continues to increase 
as managerial block sizes rises 
Figure 2. Cubic relationship between managerial blockholders and firm value 
 
Note: The Convergence of interest and enrichment hypotheses used to explain the relationship between Here this 
cubic relationship between shareholders’ block size and firm value given by equation below.  
FVit = ω0 + ω1MBHit + ω2𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   + ω3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3+ωit FVt-1 + ωitCit                    (2) 
Where MBHit, and refer to managerial block size of firm i in year t, and its square and cube 
respectively. In next section we review the validity of both hypothesis using range of methods.  
3. Data and Methodology 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
To estimate the dynamic model here we justified the relationships between non-
managerial/managerial blockholders and the firm value using the Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM). The early literature by Morck et al. (1988), and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), ignored the ownership structure as an endogenous variable in analysing the relationship 
between ownership concentration and the firm value. This study has the advantage of using 
panel data which that enable the study to control for unobservable heterogeneity by an 
individual effect. Furthermore using GMM estimator is an efficient methods taking the 
endogeneity issue into account as well as both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity 
issues by implementing instruments. 
Using equation 3 and 4 given below, we applied the GMM on panel dataset to examine the 
shape of the relationship, quadratic relationship between non-managerial blockholders and firm 
value, and cubic relationship between managerial blockholders and firm value. 
FVit = β0 + β1NBHit + β2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2+ βitFVt-1 + βitCit + dt + ηi + υit                          (3)   
FVit = ω0 + ω1MBHit + ω2𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   + ω3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3+ωit FVt-1 + ωitCit + dt + ηi + υit         (4) 
Where dt that measures the temporal effect with the corresponding dummy variables is 
considered, hence the effect of macroeconomic variables on firm value is also controlled.  
Granger Causality  
Here the causality test, introduced by Granger (1969), is applied in order to evaluate the causal 
relationship between blockholder ownership and firm value and to test the robustness of the 
result achieved from GMM to investigate further whether there are any causal relationships 
between NBH/MBH and firm value, and also to explore whether changes in the cause variable 
leads to changes in the effect variable. First we applied the stationary test to avoid any spurious 
causality results. In this case, the study would estimate misleading inferences about the 
measured parameters and the degree of their connotations.  
According to Hamilton (1994) and Thomsen et al. (2006), the causality test between ownership 
concentration and firm value considers firm value as a forward looking variable. It means that 
investors might predict the firm value changes and therefore firm value can cause changes in 
block sizes that shareholder own. Hence, considering firm value as a forward looking variable 
is essential in this study because an AIM company is allowed to postpone the disclosure of 
information that relates to forthcoming developments or matters in the process of negotiation. 
This implies, if large blockholders have inside information, they may increase (decrease) their 
ownership because they know that the firm value is likely to increase (decrease) in the next 
period. Thomsen et al. (2006) solve this problem by considering the changes in firm value 
before changes in shareholders’ block sizes. 
Here, in order to consider the firm specific effect, the Granger tests and panel data analysis 
should be combined so as to be able to overcome one of the main disadvantages of Granger 
causality, which is requiring time series information. To apply a standard Granger causality 
test, first a simple linear regression is considered to determine the cause, effect and the type of 
relationship. Equations 5 and 6 illustrate the causality relationship between non-managerial 
shareholders and firm value. 
FVit = C1 + α1NBHt-1 + α2FVt-1 + μ1t                                            (5) 
NBHit= C2 + α3NBHt-1 + α4FVt-1 + μ1t                                          (6) 
Moreover, equations (7) and (8) below show the causality relationship between managerial 
blockholders and firm value.  
FVit = C'1 + γ1MBHt-1 + γ2FVt-1 + μ1t                                         (7) 
MBHit = C'2 + γ3MBHt-1 + γ4FVt-1 + μ1t                                     (8) 
Where: 
- α1(γ1) ≠ 0 and α2(γ2) = 0 indicates that there is unidirectional Granger causality 
from non-managerial (managerial) blockholder to firm value. Therefore the 
blockholder would be the predictor of firm value.  
- α1(γ1) = 0 and α2(γ2) ≠ 0, indicates that the unidirectional Granger causality is from 
firm value to non-managerial (managerial) blockholder; thus it can be concluded 
that firm value is a blockholder predictor.  
- α1(γ1) ≠ 0 and α2(γ2) ≠ 0 specifies that there is bi-directional Granger causality 
between firm value and non-managerial (managerial) blockholders; therefore both 
firm value and non-managerial (managerial) blockholders have a mutual impact.  
However, blockholders can impact firm value directly and indirectly (Thomsen et al., 2006). 
The direct impact can be estimated by the change of blockholders following the change of firm 
value, whereas the indirect impact should consider the change of blockholder before the change 
in firm value, this implies blockholders might have inside information about the firm; which 
this may lead them to sell or buy shares before a change in firm value. While this is illegal in 
the AIM, the possibility cannot be excluded that blockholders sell or buy shares because of 
their inside information about firm value that might fall or rise in the next period. Also to 
measure the firm value Tobin’s Q which it is a known concept that has been used in finance 
researches for the value of the firm in various studies (Morck et al., 1988; Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988; Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Lins, 2003; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Fahlenbrach, 2004; Black, 2005). In this study the firm size7, leverage is used to 
consider structural differences that companies use in terms of their long- and short-term 
financing tools in different countries. Furthermore, intangible assets used as another control 
variable, because intangible assets proxy for future growth opportunities.  
4. Findings and Results   
This study creates an unbalanced panel data which in total 805 companies were extracted from 
DataStream as companies listed in the AIM as at 31st December 2013. Here we consider 
blockholders as shareholders who own at least five per cent of the total firm shares. Therefore, 
companies whose largest shareholders own fewer than five per cent of total shares were 
dropped from the sample. Also, as the study uses lags to test the association between the 
variables, following Miguel et al. (2006), only those firms which have information available 
for at least six consecutive years (2008–2013) remained in the sample.8 Moreover, following 
Lins (2003) and Miguel et al. (2006), financial companies are removed from the sample. Hence 
the final sample includes 443 companies. Companies’ financial information was extracted from 
DataStream and the information about block sizes was extracted from Thomson One Banker. 
Table 1 illustrates that the number of non-managerial blockholders is higher than the number of 
managerial blockholders. Generally, the sample includes 318 non-managerial blockholders and 
125 managerial blockholders. It also illustrates that most of the non-managerial and managerial 
blockholders have up to 30 per cent of total shares. Next, Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of data used here which it justifies that the means of the main variables, which are 
ownership concentration and the firm value, are not significantly different between the two 
groups, NBH and MBH. Therefore, it can be concluded that the ownership is concentrated at 
the same level in both managerial and non-managerial groups of blockholders in the AIM. 
However, among control variables, it indicates that the NBH companies are larger in terms of 
size. Clearly then, the companies with external blockholders are larger than companies with 
insider blockholders.  
                                                          
7 measured by a log of assets 
8 As Miguel et al. (2006) explain, this condition is necessary in order to have enough periods when testing for the 
second-order serial correlation in the GMM. 
Table 1- Non-managerial and managerial block sizes 
Block size Non-managerial Managerial Total 
5% - under 10% 43 22 65 
10% - under 15% 76 26 102 
15% - under 20% 64 31 95 
20% - under 25% 45 14 59 
25% - under 30% 45 12 57 
30% - under 35% 9 5 14 
35% - under 40% 10 3 13 
40% - under 45% 9 2 11 
45% - under 50% 6 2 8 
Over 50% 11 8 19 
Total 318 125 443 
Note: The sample includes 443 companies whose largest blockholders have at least 5% of total shares. The 
sample divided into two subsamples of 318 non-managerial blockholders and 125 managerial blockholders. Data 
about the blocksizes are extracted from Thomson One Banker. 
Table 2- Descriptive Statistics of firm value (Tobin’s Q) and ownership concentration and other 
control variables for both non-managerial blockholders and managerial blockholders 
Variable  No observations Mean 
Mean 
difference StDev Min Max 
 
Tobin’s Q 
All 2871 0.338  0.550 0.007 1.068 




All 4968 20.663  12.315 5.000 69.23 
NBH 3410 20.489 0.061 11.941 5.000 61.52 MBH 1768 21.137 13.362 5.010 69.23 
Second largest 
Blockholder 
All 4385 14.523  5.122 5.000 44.12 
NBH 2923 14.103 0.032 6.003 5.000 33.84 
MBH 1461 14.957  5.025 5.000 44.12 
 
Firm size 
All 4350 3279  1.621 0.000 29462 
NBH 2401 3054 0.006*** 1.802 0.000 29462 MBH 1134 3391 1.566 0.000 22176 
 
Intangible assets 
All 4736 0.193  0.742 0.000 2700 
NBH 2654 0.259 0.090 0.929 0.000 2700 MBH 1215 0.162 0.475 0.000 5981 
 
Leverage 
All 3173 0.585  0.451 0.019 1.583 
NBH 1806 0.143 0.618 0.498 0.019 1.523 MBH 839 0.518 0.445 0.011 1.583 
Note: All blockholders are inclusive of NBH and MBH; Number of observations (N) is the number of years 
observations of available data. Mean-difference is the difference between the mean of the NBH with the mean of 
MBH. 
The Column 1 of Table 3 represents the results of GMM estimations that have been applied in 
order to evaluate the impact of NBH on Tobin’s Q. The statistical significance and the opposite 
signs of the coefficients of NBH and NBH2 confirm that the relationship between NBH and 
firm value is quadratic with point of maxima as predicted by the hypothesis I. The value of 
NBH at this breakpoint can be obtained as follow:   
NBH = −𝛽𝛽1 2β2�  =32% 
This implies in the firms which have non-managerial blockholders, the firm value increases as 
ownership concentration rises from five per cent to 32 per cent; however, when the block size 
of non-managerial blockholders exceeds 32 per cent, it has an inverse relationship with firm 
value. This result shows that the non-managerial blockholders who own between five per cent 
and 32 per cent of total shares monitor the company’s managers more efficiently, while the 
non-managerial blockholders who own more than 32 per cent of total shares expropriate 
minority shareholders, as shown in Figure 1. 
The results in Table 3 show that in the AIM of the London Stock Exchange, non-managerial 
blockholders affect the firm value significantly. This might originate from the AIM rules for 
companies that do not require them to adhere to a particular set of corporate governance rules, 
and let the insiders delay information announcement. Therefore, non-managerial blockholders 
owning between five per cent and 32 per cent of total shares might bear the whole additional 
cost of increased monitoring, while earning the profit arising from the improved monitoring on 
a pro rata basis (the free rider problem) in order to protect themselves from being expropriated 
by managers in the weak corporate governance environment. Furthermore, the results illustrate 
that non-managerial blockholders owning more than 32 per cent of total shares reduce the firm 
value; this also can be explained by the AIM rules that do not emphasise the independency of 
the company, the corporate governance of the main market of the London Stock Exchange does 
not allow companies to have blockholders with more than 30 per cent of total shares. However, 
as the corporate governance of the AIM does not emphasise the independency of the company 
and allows the firm to have large blockholders and delay the announcements of information, 




Table 3- The result of GMM Estimation for both non-managerial blockholders and managerial 
blockholders 
 (1) (2) 













































z 1875.64 8292.31 
AR(1) -0.923** -0.007** 
AR(2) -0.425 -0.018 
Sargan 20.56 18.24 
Note: FVit = β0 + β1NBHit + β2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2+ βitFVt-1 + βitCit + dt + ηi + υit;  FVit = ω0 + ω1MBHit + ω2𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   + 
ω3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3+ωit FVt-1 + ωitCit + dt + ηi + υit .z is a Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, 
asymptotically distributed under the null of no relationship 
 
Moreover, the result here shows that firm size has a significant negative correlation with firm value. 
The negative relationship between firm value and firm size can be supported by the argument 
mentioned by Maury and Pajuste (2005), Miguel et al. (2006) and Hadani et al. (2011). They 
stated that larger firms are likely to have a higher level of information asymmetry and hence a 
more severe agency problem that results in reduced firm value. In addition, it can be seen that 
leverage and intangible fixed assets are positively correlated. Maury and Pajuste (2005) 
identified that leverage can positively affect the firm value by playing a disciplinary role and 
restraining the free cash flow at hand, thus decreasing profit diversion. In support to Miguel et 
al. (2006), the direct relationship between firm value and intangible fixed assets confirms the 
prediction that this variable proxies for future growth opportunities.9  
                                                          
9 Maury and Pajuste (2005) explain that a higher proportion of intangible assets such as human capital can result 
in generating higher cash flows. 
We identified that the weak corporate governance of the AIM encourages blockholders who 
have block sizes of between five per cent and 32 per cent to monitor managers in order to 
protect themselves, and thus increase the firm value. However, the AIM corporate governance 
system allows large blockholders to expropriate small shareholders for their own benefit, hence 
decreasing the firm value. Thus the findings of this study support Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
who argue that in companies with low ownership concentration, the agency problem originates 
from the conflict between managers and outsider dispersed shareholders, while in companies 
with high ownership concentration, the agency problem comes from the conflict between large 
and small shareholders.  
Therefore the column 1 of table 3 supports the hypothesis I, whereas the firm value first rises 
and, after a breakpoint, declines as block size increases. The Column 2 in Table 3 shows the 
results of GMM estimations that have been applied in order to evaluate the impact of MBH on 
Tobin’s Q. It indicates that the statistical significance and the signs of the coefficients of MBH, 
MBH2, and MBH3 confirm that the relationship between MBH and firm value is cubic. Also, 
the coefficient signs of MBH2 and MBH3 prove that the first breakpoint of the cubic function is 
a point of maxima and the second stationary point is a point of minima, as shown in Figure 2.  
The stationary point of cubic function of equation 2 can be computed from the following 
equation:   
MBH1,2 = = 
−2𝜔𝜔2 ± �4𝜔𝜔22−12𝜔𝜔1𝜔𝜔3
6𝜔𝜔3
 = 31% and 54% 
Consequently, the result confirms the existence of both convergence of interest and the 
entrenchment effect on the relationship between MBH and firm value. This implies that for 
MBH values between five per cent and 31 per cent, any increase in block size will result in an 
increase in the firm value, because of greater incentives for MBH to maximize value as their 
block size increases. However, when MBH ranges from 31 per cent to 54 per cent, firm value 
decreases by any increase in MBH.  This result explains that rises in MBH between 31 per cent 
and 54 per cent cause managerial blockholders to be less concerned about the benefit to the rest 
of the shareholders, and their larger block sizes and the weak corporate governance of the AIM 
enable them to entrench themselves. Finally, for the very large MBH, above 54 per cent, 
convergence of interest again controls the relationship. Therefore the column 2 of the table 3 
confirms the hypothesis II, whereas the firm value first increases, then decreases, and finally 
continues to increase as managerial block size rises, is supported. Moreover the negative sign 
of second largest blockholder is also illustrating that distribution of power in the company 
result to less expropriation by the largest shareholder.  
Therefore, in line with the result of Maury and Pajuste (2005) the second largest block size has 
positive impact on the firm value. As illustrated from GMM estimation, both NBH and MBH 
have a significant impact on the firm value. However, as mentioned by Thomsen et al. (2006), 
the causation could, in some circumstances, run in the opposite direction. Hence here we 
evaluate the reverse causality between NBH/MBH and Tobin’s Q to find out whether or not 
firm value has an impact on the NBH and MBH.  To avoid the spurious causality results first 
we applied the panel contains unit root and Table 4 illustrates the results of the unit root tests 
on NBH/MBH and Tobin’s Q, firm size, leverage and intangibles. This result indicates that all 
main and control variables are significant at 1% level of significance; therefore the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected and all variables are stationary.  
Table 4- The result of Unit root test on NBH/MBH and Tobin’s Q, firm size, leverage and 
intangibles 
Variable Blockholder type Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Panel A Main Variables Levin-Lin-Chu Harris-Tzavalis 
Tobin’s Q 
NBH -6.423 0.000 0.495 0.000 
MBH -3.832 0.000 0.530 0.000 
Block size 
NBH -4.951 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MBH -4.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B Control Variables 
Second Largest 
BH 
NBH -3.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MBH -4.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm size 
NBH -6.941 0.000 0.698 0.000 
MBH -12.807 0.000 0.705 0.000 
Leverage 
NBH -5.0 17 0.000 0.734 0.000 
MBH -4.010 0.000 0.447 0.000 
Intangibles 
NBH -10.089 0.000 0.613 0.000 
MBH -4.004 0.000 0.689 0.000 
Note: The null and alternative hypotheses are: Ho: Panels contain unit roots.  
Next the causality between blockholders and firm value are tested and the result from Table 5 
reports the results of the causality test on  NBH and Tobin’s Q. Model I of both the OLS and 
fixed effect panel data presented in Table 3.5 shows the result of the causality test by 
considering only the changes of NBH and Tobin’s Q, while Model II illustrates the outcome of 
the same tests by considering the control variables as well as the main variables. Also both 
Models I and II report an insignificant impact of Tobin’s Q changes on the NBH, and also the 
second column of Model I and Model II present the impact of NBH on Tobin’s Q. As expected 
and in line with the GMM result, both OLS and fixed effect panel data confirm that NBH 
changes have a strong significant impact on Tobin’s Q.  
Furthermore, evaluating control variables illustrate that the signs of firm size, leverage and 
intangible fixed assets coefficients are the same as those shown by GMM when Tobin’s Q is 
the dependent variable. However, when NBH is the dependent variable, the coefficient sign of 
the leverage variable is negative, but it is not significant. In addition, the negative relationship 
between NBH and firm size explains that larger companies have less concentrated ownership. 
Finally, it can be seen that intangible fixed assets have no significant impact on the NBH. 
Table 6 shows the estimations for the group of NBH with less than 32% of total shares. The 
results shown in both models illustrate that Tobin’s Q has no significant impact on the NBH, 
while testing the other side of causality shows that NBH has a significant impact on Tobin’s Q. 
This result confirms that non-managerial blockholders with small and medium block sizes 
improve firm value by accepting the costs of monitoring managers.10 
Furthermore, Table 7 reports the results of estimating Granger causality between Tobin’s Q 
and the second group of NBH with block sizes larger than 32%. The results shown in both 
models prove that Tobin’s Q has no significant impact on the NBH, while NBH has significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q. The negative relationship reported between Tobin’s Q and NBH clarifies 
that for any increase in managerial block sizes larger than 32 per cent, the firm value decreases, 
which confirms the result generated by applying GMM test. 
Generally, the results obtained from Granger causality tests confirm the results from quadratic 
model by GMM estimation, showing that non-managerial blockholders of the AIM who own 
more than five per cent and less than 32 per cent of total shares improve the firm value because 
of their incentive to monitor managers. On the other hand, non-managerial blockholders having 
more than 32 per cent of total shares expropriate other shareholders by taking advantage of 
                                                          
10 This finding is in line with the monitoring hypothesis mentioned by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) and Miguel 
et al. (2006). 
their private information. It can be seen that the quadratic relationship between NBH and firm 
value is revealed with and without consideration of dynamic endogeneity; however, the level of 
significance is different in GMM and fixed effect panel data, which highlights the impact of 
considering dynamic endogeneity.  
Previously the GMM estimation show that managerial blockholders have a significant impact 
on the firm value. Furthermore we applied, Granger causality tests to investigate whether firm 
value has a significant impact on managerial blockholders. Table 8 reports the result of an 
inverse relationship between MBH and Tobin’s Q and shows that MBH has a significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q, while Tobin’s Q has no significant impact on the MBH.  
Generally, based on the results achieved from analysing the relationship between NBH/MBH 
and Tobin’s Q, we justified that in the AIM, blockholders have significant impact on the firm 
value, while firm value does not affect blockholders significantly. As mentioned by Miguel et 
al. (2006), the negative association between firm value and size explains that it is more difficult 
for insiders to own a significant fraction of a larger firm. Furthermore, the positive coefficient 
on debt confirms that debt and insider ownership can substitute one another to mitigate 
information and agency conflicts (Lins, 2003; Miguel et al., 2006). 
Table 5- The result table of Granger causality test on Tobin's Q and NBH 
Note: This table reports the result of reverse causality between NBH and Tobin’s Q by using the following regressions: FVit = C1 + α1NBHt-1 + 
α2FVt-1 + μ1t; and NBHit= C2 + α3NBHt-1 + α4FVt-1 + μ1. The result obtained from OLS and fixed effect panel data estimations. The explanatory and control 
variables are defined in Table 4.A.1. Number (N) of observations is the number of observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity 
consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level. ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5%. 
 OLS Fixed effect 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 0.11 -0.036
 0.414 0.281*** 22.58*** -0.705*** 22.09*** -0.090 
(0.81) (-1.69) (1.15) (7.86) (37.89) (-5.40) (23.07) (-0.89) 
         
Tobin’s Q-L1 0.004 0.844
*** 0.010 0.532*** 0.202 0.629*** 0.192 0.298*** 
(0.04) (43.95) (0.82) (30.05) (1.82) (25.16) (1.18) (11.96) 
         
NBH-L1 0.992
*** 0.001 0.877*** 0.003 0.127*** 0.032*** 0.259*** 0.050*** 
(173.80) (1.88) (39.00) (1.67) (4.31) (5.02) (6.98) (4.62) 
         
Second Largest BH   1.121 1.108   0.933 1.22 
  (0.55) (1.80)   (0.83) (1.75) 
         
Firm size   -0.021 -0.105
***   -0.021 -0.204*** 
  (-0.28) (-12.84)   (-0.19) (-16.91) 
         
Debt ratio   -0.001 0.000   -0.001 0.000   (-0.51) (0.82)   (-0.92) (0.69) 
         
Intangibles   0.000 0.000   0.079 0.000
*** 
  (0.68) (0.09)   (0.81) (6.95) 
         
N (observations) 1345 1133 1195 1033 1345 1133 1195 1033 
Table 6- The result table of Granger causality test on Tobin's Q and NBH less than 32% 
Note: This table reports the result of reverse causality between NBH and Tobin’s Q, when NBH is less than 32%.  Regressions are defined as FVit = C1 + α1NBHt-1 + α2FVt-1 
+ μ1t; and NBHit= C2 + α3NBHt-1 + α4FVt-1 + μ1. The result obtained from running OLS and fixed effect panel data estimations. The explanatory and control variables are 
defined in Table 4.A.1. Number (N) of observations is the number of observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 
1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level. ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5%.
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Firm size   -0.019 (-0.85) 
-0.101*** 





         
Debt ratio   -0.000 (-0.07) 
0.008*** 





         









        
 1881 1634 1202 1135 2757 1634 2023 1135 
N (observations) 1989 1756 1212 1183 2952 1817 2004 1176 
Table 7- The result of Granger causality test on Tobin's Q and NBH greater than 32% 
Note: This table reports the result of reverse causality between NBH and Tobin’s Q, when NBH is greater than 32%.  Regressions are defined as FVit = C1 + α1NBHt-1 + 
α2FVt-1 + μ1t; and NBHit= C2 + α3NBHt-1 + α4FVt-1 + μ1. The result obtained from OLS and fixed effect panel data estimations. The explanatory and control variables are 
defined in Table 4.A.1. Number (N) of observations is the number of observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 
1980) and adjusted for clustering at stock level. ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5%. 
 OLS Fixed effect 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q NBH Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 9.173
*** 0.166 9.315 0.245*** 53.292*** 1.677*** 45.401*** 1.237*** 
(5.31) (0.74) (4.65) (6.35) (19.34) (5.07) (12.52) (4.98) 
         
Tobin’s Q-L1 
-0.000 0.091*** - 0.082 0.681*** -0.002 0.613*** -0.021 0.189*** 
(-0.49) (6.62) (-1.61) (5.05) (-0.05) (9.15) (-0.28) (3.74) 
         
NBH-L1 0.807
*** -0.011*** 0.869*** -0.000** 0.102 -0.037*** 0.173*** -0.037*** 
(22.17) (-2.51) (14.39) (2.61) (1.80) (-5.38) (2.64) (-4.29) 
         
Second Largest BH   1.370 -3.04   0.971 -1.490 
  (1.52) (-1.78)   (1.76) (-1.23) 
         
Firm size   -0.035 -0.057
***   0.532** -0.216*** 
  (-0.79) (-11.89)   (2.36) (-7.85) 
         
Debt ratio   -0.000 0.025
   -0.069 0.020 
  (-0.07) (1.23)   (-0.74) (0.97) 
         
Intangibles   0.110 0.029
***   0.000 0.000** 
  (0.23) (2.93)   (0.45) (2.37) 
         
N (observations) 244 163 168 127 331 150 325 203 
Table 8- The result table of Granger causality test on Tobin's Q and MBH 
 
Note: This table reports the result of reverse causality between NBH and Tobin’s Q by using the following regressions: FVit = C1 + α1NBHt-1 + α2FVt-1 + μ1t; and NBHit= C2 
+ α3NBHt-1 + α4FVt-1 + μ1. The result obtained from OLS and fixed effect panel data estimations. The explanatory and control variables are defined in Table 4.A.1. Number 
(N) of observations is the number of observations of available data. Reported in parentheses t-value is heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980) and adjusted for clustering 
at stock level. ‘***’ indicates significance at 1%, ‘**’ indicates significance at 5%. 
 OLS Fixed effect 
 Model I Model II  Model I 
 MBH Tobin’s Q MBH Tobin’s Q MBH Tobin’s Q MBH Tobin’s Q 
Intercept -0.098
*** 0.038** -0.153 0.061 53.021*** 39.390*** 107.329*** 44.05*** 
(-2.99) (2.25) (-2.05) (1.06) (5.77) (4.36) (6.40) (3.89) 
         
Tobin’s Q-L1 -0.009 1.019
*** -0.12 1.001*** 0.000 0.725*** 0.000 0.631*** 
(-0.85) (183.46) (-0.48) (182.98) (0.10) (20.01) (0.51) (8.23) 
         
MBH-L1 0.999
*** 0.000* 1.531*** 0.000** 0.911*** 0.069*** 0.982*** 0.126*** 
(3.56) (1.86) (4.01) (2.37) (5.99) (4.36) (3.21) (3.04) 
         
Second Largest BH   0.001 0.008   0.000 0.004 
  (1.18) (1.98)   (1.37) (1.89) 
         
Firm size   0.112 0.002   0.081
*** -0.262*** 
  (1.09) (0.42)   (3.87) (-6.01) 
         
Debt ratio   0.006 0.000   0.002 0.000
*** 
  0.17) (0.11)   (0.24) (3.73) 
         
Intangibles   0.017 0.000   0.142 0.106
*** 
  (1.04) (0.08)   (1.56) (3.76) 
         




Different literature, such as Miguel et al. (2006) and Thomsen et al. (2006), mention that 
blockholders have no significant impact on the firm value in the UK because of the UK low 
ownership concentration and high investor protection. Considering the significance difference 
between the corporate governance of the main market of the London Stock Exchange and the 
AIM, this paper examines the relationship between the value of AIM companies and their 
ownership structures using panel data to eliminate unobservable firm heterogeneity. 
Moreover, as ownership concentration is an endogenous variable, the study should control for 
the endogeneity too. Also Henry (2010) mentions, ownership concentration endogeneity can 
be in the form of a dynamic sense and/or reverse causality. Thus, this study controls the 
dynamic sense of endogeneity by employing GMM, and the reverse causality by using the 
Granger causality test for panel data developed by Thomsen et al. (2006). 
The findings of this study have important theoretical and managerial implications. In terms of 
Theoretical implications, this study finds evidence for both monitoring and expropriation 
hypotheses when studying the impact of external blockholders on the firm value and evidence 
for both convergence of interest and Entrenchment hypotheses when studying the impact of 
internal blockholders on the firms value. By following Lins (2003), Miguel et al. (2006), 
Edmans (2014) and Basu et al. (2016) we investigate the impact of managerial blockholders 
and also non-managerial blockholders on the firm value. Here we examined the impact of 
managerial and non-managerial blockholders separately by categorizing blockholders into 
two groups of non-managerial blockholders and managerial blockholders. Studying the 
association between non-managerial blockholders and the firm value reveals that both 
monitoring and expropriation hypotheses can explain the effect of non-managerial 
blockholders on the firm value. These two hypotheses are supported by defining a quadratic 
relationship between block sizes (that non-managerial blockholders hold) and the firm value. 
The empirical results extracted from GMM estimation here illustrated that non-managerial 
blockholders who own between five per cent and 32 per cent of total shares monitor 
managers and therefore are able to improve the firm value. However, non-managerial 
blockholders holding more than 32 per cent of total shares expropriate other shareholders and 
hence reduce the company’s value.  
Furthermore, evaluating the impact of managerial blockholders on the firm value supports 




The empirical results of this study reveal that the interest of AIM managerial blockholders 
owning from five per cent to 31 per cent of total shares converges with the interest of other 
shareholders, and hence the firm value increases. These blockholders enrich themselves when 
they own 31–54 per cent of total shares and their interest converges with other shareholders’ 
interests when they have large block sizes greater that 54 per cent. As previously mentioned, 
several studies find that in the UK, the ownership concentration is low and thus the impact of 
blockholders on the firm value is not significant (Thomsen et al., 2006; Miguel et al., 2006). 
This study contributes to the debate by providing evidence about the high ownership 
concentration in the AIM of the London Stock Exchange and showing that blockholder is one 
of the significant determinants of the value of firms listed in this sub-market of the UK. 
Moreover, testing the inverse causality between non-managerial/managerial blockholders and 
the firm value finds no effect of firm value on the ownership concentration. This result is 
consistent with the conjecture by Demsetz (1983). Although the results obtained by Granger 
causality confirm the curvilinear relationship defined between non-managerial blockholders 
and firm value, the significance of this impact varies when considering dynamic endogeneity 
by applying GMM. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no reverse causality between 
blockholders and the firm value; however, it is important to consider the dynamic 
endogeneity. 
In terms of managerial implications, this study seems to indicate that, blockholders do not 
always create value for firms listed in the AIM. Findings of this study should be of interest to 
managers of firms having internal or external blockholders.  Managers of firms with external 
blockholders should alert that the firm value increases as ownership concentration rises from 
five per cent to 32 per cent as blockholder would accept the free rider problem and monitor 
the performance of managers thus the firm perfeormance and value would improve. 
However, when the block size of external blockholders exceeds 32 per cent, it would impact 
the firm value inversely. This result shows that the external blockholders who own more than 
32 per cent of total shares expropriate minority shareholders by voice and exit. Moreover, 
managers should consider the fact that, even when blockholders are internal (part of 
management team), they still should pay close attention to those having blocks ranges from 
31 per cent to 54 per cent as this group might expropriate other shareholders in their own 
benefit by taking advantage of their managerial authority.  Finally, study findings also 
highlight the importance of managerial role in firms listed in the weak corporate governance 
markets such as AIM, as these firms normally have blockholders and because of high 
 
 
information asymmetry that the weak corporate governance create blockholders would find 
the opportunity to entrench themselves in cost of other shareholders.  
The limitation of this study is the data availability and issues with missing observations. The 
main reason for data limitation and high volume of missing observation is that the companies 
in Alternative Investment Market are not required to submit their data, especially they are 
allowed to delay in publishing their internal information. This is generally because they are 
new and many of them are private companies with high level of information asymmetric. 
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